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Optimal Beamforming for Physical Layer
Security in MISO Wireless Networks
Z. Sheng, H. D. Tuan, T. Q. Duong and H. V. Poor
Abstract
A wireless network of multiple transmitter-user pairs overheard by an eavesdropper, where the
transmitters are equipped with multiple antennas while the users and eavesdropper are equipped with a
single antenna, is considered. At different levels of wireless channel knowledge, the problem of interest
is beamforming to optimize the users’ quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of their secrecy throughputs
or maximize the network’s energy efficiency under users’ QoS. All these problems are seen as very
difficult optimization problems with many nonconvex constraints and nonlinear equality constraints in
beamforming vectors. The paper develops path-following computational procedures of low-complexity
and rapid convergence for the optimal beamforming solution. Their practicability is demonstrated through
numerical examples.
Index Terms
Multi-input single output network, secure communication, energy-efficient communication, beam-
forming, path-following algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing information has emerged as one of the most critical issues in wireless communication
[1], [2]. The broadcast nature of wireless transmissions implies that they can be quite vulnerable
to adversary, who attempts to intercept their information delivery or overhear the confidential
information intended for their users [3], [4]. Physical layer security (PLS) exploiting the physical
properties of wireless channels [5], [6] has been proposed to ensure the secrecy of data trans-
missions to end-users of low complexity, for which encryption cannot be used. PLS is based on
information theoretic characterizations of secrecy, under which the user secrecy throughput of a
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2wireless transmission overheard by eavesdroppers is determined as the difference between the
user throughput and eavesdroppers’ throughput [2], [7]. Transmit beamforming to improve the
user throughput while controlling the throughput of the wiretapped signal at the eavesdroppers
thus presents an effective way for secrecy throughput enhancement. Beamforming design for
maximizing instantaneous secrecy throughput has been considered in [8]–[12] by semi-definite
relaxation and randomization with the known inefficiency [13]. This beamforming design has
been successfully addressed in [14], [15]. In regards to outage probability, several works such
as [16], [17] used the Bernstein-type inequalities obtained in an unpublished work [18]. We
will show that the results based on such Bernstein-type inequalities may be very conservative.
Reference [19] considered outage region characterization of given beamformers under imperfect
channel state information (CSI).
On the other hand, as energy efficiency (EE) became a very serious concern in wireless
communication [20], [21], the secure energy efficiency (SEE), which is the ratio of the secrecy
throughput to the total network power consumption, measured in terms of secrecy bits per Joule
per Hertz is also increasingly important in SPL [22], [23]. Exploiting the perfect CSI, the SEE
maximization in [24]–[26] is based on costly beamformers, which completely cancel the multi-
user interference and wiretapped signal at the eavesdroppers. The computational complexity of
the SEE optimization algorithms for single-user multi-input multi-output (MIMO)/single-input
single-output (SISO) communications in [27] and [28] is also high as each iteration still involves
a difficult nonconvex optimization problem. Our previous work [23] considered SEE optimization
for a more general case of MIMO networks. SEE optimization was also considered in [15] for
the worst case of uncertainties for users’ and eavesdroppers’ channels. There is no existing work
on SEE optimization with secrecy throughput in terms of probability outage.
In this paper, we consider a network of multiple transmitter-user pair overheard by an eaves-
dropper. As the transmitters are assumed to be equipped with multiple antennas while the
users and eavesdropper are equipped with a single antennas, the target is to design transmit
beamformers to optimize either the users’ quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of their secrecy
throughput or the network’s SEE under the users’ QoS. It should be realized that these problems
of beamforming design are still widely open for research, so we consider them at different levels
of channel knowledge. The paper is structured as follows. Section II is devoted to the problem
statements. Section III considers these problems under the perfect CSI of the all concerned
channels, where path-following algorithms of low complexity are developed for their solution.
3In Section IV, the perfect CSI of the channels between the transmitters and user is assumed
but only the distribution of the channels between the transmitters and eavesdropper is assumed
known. As such, the eavesdropper’s throughput is not deterministically defined but is defined
through its probability outage, which leads to a nonlinear equation in beamforming vectors and
the eavesdropper’s throughput, making the beamforming designs much more computationally
challenging. Under the same knowledge on the channels between the transmitters and eaves-
dropper in Section IV, Section V also assumes that the channels between the transmitters and
users are uncertain with Gaussian distributed errors, under which there is no known result on
the probability outage of the users’ throughput. Nevertheless, based on a new result on outage
probability obtained in Appendix I, both problems of users’ QoS optimization and network’s
SEE optimization are successfully addressed. The simulation Section V shows the efficiency of
the path-following algorithms developed in sections III-V. Conclusions are given in Section VI.
Appendix I provides a new result on both upper bound and lower bound of the outage-aware user
throughput. Appendix II shows the conservativeness of some other results, which are based on
Bernstein type inequalities. Some fundamental deterministic inequalities that are used in Sections
III-V are given in Appendix III.
Notation. The inner product between vectors x and y is defined as 〈x, y〉 = xHy. Analogously,
〈X, Y 〉 = Trace(XHY ) for matrices X and Y . Optimization variables are boldfaced. Also the
notation
∑M
j 6=i refers to the summation taking over the index set {1, . . . ,M} \ {i}. I is the
identity matrix of appropriate dimension and CN (0, I) is the set of complex Gaussian random
variables of zero means and identity covariance.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
Consider a communication network of M transmitter-user pairs overheard by an eavesdropper.
Each transmitter is equipped with Nt transmit antennas while the users and eavesdropper are
equipped by a single antenna. Thus, without the eavesdropper, the network looks very much like
that considered in [29]–[33]. Each information si for user i, which is normalized to E(s
2
i ) = 1,
is beamformed by wi ∈ CNt . The received signal at user i is
yi = h
H
iiwisi +
M∑
j 6=i
hHjiwjsj + ni, (1)
where hji ∈ CNt is the vector channel from transmitter j to user i and ni is the background
noise with power σ2i .
4Analogously, the received signal at the eavesdropper is
yE =
M∑
i=1
hHiewixi + ne, (2)
where hie ∈ CNt is the vector channel from transmitter i to the eavesdropper and ne is the
background noise with power σ2e .
For w , [wi]i=1,...,M , suppose that fi(w) is the throughput user i while gi(w) is the wiretapped
throughput for user i at the eavesdropper. Our interest is the following optimization problems.
• Secrecy throughput maximin optimization under transmitters’ power constraints:
max
w
Φ(w) , min
i=1,...,M
[fi(w)− gi(w)] s.t. (3a)
||wi||2 ≤ Pi, i = 1, . . . ,M, (3b)
with Pi given to set the limit of transmission power at transmitter i.
• Energy efficiency maximization over the secrecy throughput threshold constraints:
max
w
Θ(w) ,
[
M∑
i=1
[fi(w)− gi(w)]
]
/π(w) s.t. (3b), (4a)
fi(w)− gi(w) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M, (4b)
with given ci to set the QoS threshold for user i and the total network power consumption
π(w) , ζ
M∑
i=1
||wi||2 + Pc in transmitting wisi, where 0 < ζ < 1 is the the reciprocal of
the drain efficiency of the power amplifier and Pc =
∑M
i=1 P
i
c with circuit power P
i
c at
transmitter i.
III. INSTANTANEOUS SECRECY THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZATION
When the perfect CSI of all channels is available at the transmitters, the user i’ instantaneous
throughput is defined by
fi(w) , ln
(
1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj|2 + σ2i
)
, (5)
while the instantaneous wiretapped throughput for user i at the eavesdropper is defined by
gi(w) , ln
(
1 +
|hHiewi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjewj |2 + σ2e
)
. (6)
For fi(w) and gi(w) defined by (5) and (6), problem (3) is a particular case of the multi-cell
beamforming design that considered in [14], [15]. We now propose a more efficient computation
tailored for (3).
5Let w(κ) be a feasible point for (3) found from (κ− 1)th iteration. Applying inequality (68)
in the Appendix II for x = 1/|hHiiwi|2, y =
∑M
j 6=i |hHjiwj|2 + σ2i , and x¯ = 1/|hHiiw(κ)i |2, y¯ =∑M
j 6=i |hHjiw(κ)j |2 + σ2i yields
fi(w) ≥ f (κ)i (w) (7)
for
f
(κ)
i (w) , ln(1 + x
(κ)
i ) +
x
(κ)
i
1 + x
(κ)
i
(
2− |h
H
iiw
(κ)
i |2
2ℜ{(w(κ)i )HhiihHiiwi} − |hHiiw(κ)i |2
−
∑M
j 6=i |hHjiwj|2 + σ2i∑M
j 6=i |hHjiw(κ)j |2 + σ2i
)
, (8)
over the trust region
2ℜ{(w(κ)i )HhiihHiiwi} − |hHiiw(κ)i |2 > 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, (9)
where
x
(κ)
i =
|hHiiw(κ)i |2∑M
j 6=i |hHjiw(κ)j |2 + σ2i
.
On the other hand, applying inequality (69) in the Appendix II for x = |hHiewi|2, y =
∑M
j 6=i |hHjewj|2+σ2e
and x¯ = |hHiew(κ)i |2, y¯ =
∑M
j 6=i |hHjew(κ)j |2+σ2e yields
gi(w) ≤ g(κ)i (w), (10)
for
g
(κ)
i (w) ,
ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i ) +
1
1 + x
(κ)
e,i
(
|hHiewi|2∑M
j 6=i(2ℜ{(w(κ)j )HhjehHjewj} − |hHjew(κ)j |2) + σ2e
− x(κ)e,i
)
, (11)
over the trust region
M∑
j 6=i
(
2ℜ{(w(κ)j )HhjehHjewj} − |hHjew(κ)j |2
)
> 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, (12)
where
x
(κ)
e,i = |hHiew(κ)i |2/(
M∑
j 6=i
|hHjew(κ)j |2 + σ2e).
At the κ-th iteration we solve the following convex optimization problem to generate the next
feasible point w(κ+1):
max
w
Φ(κ)(w) , min
i=1,...,M
[f
(κ)
i (w)− g(κ)i (w)] s.t. (3b), (9), (12) (13)
6From (7) and (10), it can be easily checked that Φ(w) ≥ Φ(κ)(w) ∀ w and Φ(w(κ)) = Φ(κ)(w(κ)).
On the other hand, Φ(κ)(w(κ+1)) > Φ(κ)(w(κ)) as far as w(κ+1) 6= w(κ) because the former is the
optimal solution of (13) while the latter is a feasible point for (13). We thus have the following
chain of inequalities and equalities:
Φ(w(κ+1)) ≥ Φ(κ)(w(κ+1)) > Φ(κ)(w(κ)) = Φ(w(κ)),
which implies that w(κ+1) is a better feasible point than w(κ) for the nonconvex optimization
problem (3). Using a similar convergence argument as [34], we can show that at least the
sequence {w(κ)} converges to its locally optimal solution. As such, the proposed Algorithm 1 a
path-following computational procedure for (11).
Algorithm 1 Path-following algorithm for maximin instantaneous secrecy throughput optimiza-
tion
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point w(0) for the convex constraints (3b).
Calculate R
(0)
min as the value of the objective in (3) at w
(0). Set κ = 0.
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (13) to obtain the solution w(κ+1).
• Calculate R(κ+1)min as the value of the objective in (3) at w(κ+1).
• Reset κ+ 1 → κ.
until
R
(κ+1)
min −R
(κ)
min)
R
(κ)
min
≤ ǫtol.
Next, we address the EE maximization (4). A direct approach (see e.g. [15]) is based on a lower
bounding approximation for the objective function in (4a). We now propose another approach,
which uses the above approximation for the numerator of the objective function only, so the
EE maximization problem (4) is indeed not more computationally difficult than the throughput
optimization problem (3).
As before, let w(κ) be its feasible point found from (κ− 1)th iteration. At the κ-th iteration,
we solve the following convex optimization problem to generate the next feasible point w(κ+1):
max
w
M∑
i=1
[f
(κ)
i (w)− g(κ)i (w)]−Θ(w(κ))π(w) s.t. (3b), (9), (12),
f
(κ)
i (w)− g(κ)i (w) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (14)
7Note that w(κ) is a feasible point for (14), under which
M∑
i=1
[f
(κ)
i (w
(κ))− g(κ)i (w(κ))]−Θ(w(κ))π(w(κ)) = 0.
Therefore, as far as w(κ+1) 6= w(κ), the optimal solution w(κ+1) of (14) must satisfy
M∑
i=1
[f
(κ)
i (w
(κ))− g(κ)i (w(κ))]−Θ(w(κ))π(w(κ+1)) > 0,
i.e. so
Θ(w(κ+1)) ,
M∑
i=1
[fi(w
(κ+1))− gi(w(κ+1))]/π(w(κ+1))
≥
M∑
i=1
[f
(κ)
i (w
(κ+1))− g(κ)i (w(κ+1))]/π(w(κ+1))
> Θ(w(κ)),
implying that w(κ+1) is a better feasible point than w(κ) for the nonconvex optimization problem
(4). As such, Algorithm 2, which is different from Algorithm 1 by solving the convex optimiza-
tion problem (14) at the κ-th iteration to generate the next feasible point w(κ+1) instead of (13)
in Algorithm 1, at least converges to a locally optimal solution.
A feasible point w(0) for (4) in the initialization of Algorithm 2 is found by using Algorithm 1)
in solving the problem
max
w
min
i=1,...,M
[fi(w)− gi(wi)]/ci s.t. (3b). (15)
Namely Algorithm 1 will terminate whenever
min
i=1,...,M
[fi(w
(κ))− gi(w(κ))]/ci ≥ 1.
Algorithm 2 Path-following algorithm for EE optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point w(0) for (4). Set κ = 0.
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (14) to obtain the solution w(κ+1).
• Reset κ+ 1 → κ.
until
Θ(w(κ+1))−Θ(w(κ))
Θ(w(κ))
≤ ǫtol.
8IV. EAVESDROPPER’S OUTAGE PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION
When the eavesdropper is no longer part of the legitimate network, the assumption on the
perfect CSI for the wiretapped channels hje at the transmitters made in the previous section is
not practical. Instead, it is common to assume that only the wiretapped channel distribution
hje =
√
h¯jeχj , χj ∈ CN (0, I), j = 1, . . . ,M (16)
is known, where
√
h¯je is a deterministic quantity which is usually dependent on the distance
from the transmitter j to the eavesdropper. The user throughput fi(w) is still defined by (5)
but the wiretapped throughput gi(w) for user i at the eavesdropper is defined via the following
outage probability instead of the instantaneous throughput defined by (6):
max{ ln(1 + ri) : Prob
(
h¯ie|χHi wi|2∑M
j 6=i h¯je|χHj wj|2 + σ2e
< ri
)
< ǫEV } (17)
for ǫEV > 0. Note that |χHj wj |2 is an exponential distribution with mean ||wj||2. Therefore, by
[35], this throughput is ln(1 + ri), where
gi,o(w, ri) = 0 (18)
for
gi,o(w, ri) , h¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + σ2e
ri
||wi||2 + h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯je||wj||2
h¯ie||wi||2
)
, (19)
which increases in ri with w held fixed.
Similarly to [35, Prop. 1] the problem of secrecy rate maximin optimization (3) is equivalently
formulated by
max
w,r
min
i=1,...,M
[ln(1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj|2 + σ2i
)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (3b) (20a)
gi,o(w, ri) ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,M, (20b)
ri > 0, (20c)
where the nonlinear equality constraint in (17) has been replaced by the nonconvex constraint
(20b).
The main difficulty is to develop a lower bounding approximation for the function gi,o(w, ri) at
a feasible point (w(κ), r(κ)) for (20), which is found from (κ−1)th iteration. Applying inequality
(68) for x = 1/rih¯je||wj||2, y = h¯ie||wi||2, and x¯ = 1/r(κ)i h¯je||w(κ)j ||2, y¯ = h¯ie||w(κ)i ||2 yields
ln
(
1 +
rih¯je||wj||2
h¯ie||wi||2
)
≥ λ(κ)ij (ri,wj,wi) (21)
9over the trust region
2ℜ{(w(κ)j )Hwj} − ||w(κ)j ||2 > 0 (22)
for
λ
(κ)
ij (ri,wj,wi) , ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + y
(κ)
ij (2−
r
(κ)
i h¯je||w(κ)j ||2
rih¯je(2ℜ{(w(κ)j )Hwj} − ||w(κ)j ||2)
− h¯ie||wi||
2
h¯ie||w(κ)i ||2
)
= ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + y
(κ)
ij (2−
r
(κ)
i ||w(κ)j ||2
ri(2ℜ{(w(κ)j )Hwj} − ||w(κ)j ||2)
− ||wi||
2
||w(κ)i ||2
) (23)
and x
(κ)
ij , r
(κ)
i h¯je||w(κ)j ||2/h¯ie||w(κ)i ||2 and y(κ)ij , x(κ)ij /(x(κ)ij + 1).
Furthermore, applying inequality (71) in the Appendix yields
ri
||wi||2 ≥ β
(κ)
i (ri,wi) (24)
where
β
(κ)
i (ri,wi) , 2
(√
r
(κ)
i /||w(κ)i ||2
)√
ri −
(
r
(κ)
i /||w(κ)i ||4
)
||wi||2, (25)
which is a concave function.
Based on (21) and (24) we obtain
gi,o(w, ri) ≥ g(κ)i,o (w, ri) (26)
for
g
(κ)
i,o (w, ri) , h¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + σ2eβ(κ)i (ri,wi) + h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
λ
(κ)
ij (ri,wj,wi), (27)
which is a concave function satisfying
gi,o(w
(κ), r
(κ)
i ) = g
(κ)
i,o (w
(κ), r
(κ)
i ).
Also, following [35], the second term in the objective (20a) is upper bounded by the linear
function
a
(κ)
i (ri) = ln(1 + r
(κ)
i )−
r
(κ)
i
r
(κ)
i + 1
+
ri
r
(κ)
i + 1
, (28)
while the first term in (20a) is lower bounded by f
(κ)
i (w) defined by (8) over the trust region
(9).
We solve the following convex program at the κ-th iteration to generate the next feasible point
(w(κ+1), r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
w,r
min
i=1,...,M
[f
(κ)
i (w)− a(κ)i (ri)] s.t (3b), (9)(20c), (22), (29a)
g
(κ)
i,o (w, ri) ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,M. (29b)
10
Then, r
(κ+1)
i is found from solving the nonlinear equation
ψi(ri) , gi,o(w
(κ), ri) = 0, i = 1, ...,M (30)
by bisection on [0, r
(κ+1)
u,i ] with tolerance ǫb such that
0 ≤ ψi(r(κ+1)i ) ≤ ǫb. (31)
A bisection on [rl, ru] for solving ψi(ri) = 0 where ψi increases in ri > 0 is implemented as
follows:
• Define ri = (rl + ru)/2. Reset rl = ri if ψi(ri) < 0. Otherwise reset ru = ri.
• Terminate until 0 ≤ ψi(ri) ≤ ǫb.
Like Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3 at least converges to a locally optimal solution of (20). Next,
Algorithm 3 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point (w(0), r(0)) for (20) and calculate
R
(0)
min as the value of the objective function in (20) at (w
(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (29) to obtain the solution (w(κ+1), r(κ+1)u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (30) to obtain the roots r(κ+1)i .
• Calculate R(κ+1)min as the value of the objective function in (20) at (w(κ+1), r(κ+1)).
• Reset κ+ 1 → κ.
until
R
(κ+1)
min −R
(κ)
min)
R
(κ)
min
≤ ǫtol.
the SEE maximization problem (4) can be formulated as
max
w,r
Θ(w, r) ,
M∑
i=1
[ln(1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj|2 + σ2i
)− ln(1 + ri)]/π(w) (32a)
s.t (3b), (20b), (20c), (32b)
ln(1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2i
)− ln(1 + ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M, (32c)
where like (3b), ci in (32c) set the QoS threshold for user i.
As such, (32) is addressed by the following iterations with the convergence guaranteed.
• Initialization. Use Algorithm 3 to obtain a feasible point (w(0), r(0)) and define
θ(0) ,
M∑
i=1
[fi(w
(0))− ln(1 + r(0)i )]/π(w(0)).
11
• κ-th iteration. Let (w(κ), r(κ)) be a feasible point found from the (κ−1)th iteration. Define
θ(κ) ,
M∑
i=1
[fi(w
(κ))− ln(1 + r(κ)i )]/π(w(κ))
and then solve the following convex optimization problem to generate the next feasible
point (w(κ+1), r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
w,r
M∑
i=1
[f
(κ)
i (w)− a(κ)i (ri)]−Θ(w(κ), r(κ))π(w) s.t. (3b), (9)(20c), (22), (29b),
f
(κ)
i (w)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . .M. (33)
Further, r
(κ+1)
i is found from solving (30).
V. ROBUST OPTIMIZATION TO COMPENSATE USERS’ OUTATE PROBABILITY
Now assume that the wiretapped channel hje is in form (16), so the wiretapped throughput
gi(w) for user i at the eavesdropper is defined via (17) but
hji = h¯ji + δχji (34)
for χji ∈ CN (0, I) and 0 < δ << 1. The term δχji thus represents the channel error in channel
state estimation. Then the user i’s throughput fi(w) is implicitly defined through the outage
probability as
ϕi,o(w) , max
{
ln(1 +Ri) : Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
∑M
j 6=i |(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj|2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
< ǫ
}
(35)
for ǫ > 0.
Note that [36]
|(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj|2 = |((1− δ)h¯ji/(1− δ) + δχji)Hwj|2
≤ (1− δ)−1|h¯jiwj |2 + δ|χHjiwj|2,
which implies
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
∑M
j 6=i |(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 + σ2i
≥
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1∑Mj 6=i |h¯Hjiwj|2 + δ∑Mj=1 |χHjiwj|2 + σ2i .
12
Consequently,
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
∑M
j 6=i |(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
≤
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1∑Mj 6=i |h¯Hjiwj|2 + δ∑Mj=1 |χHjiwj |2 + σ2i < Ri
)
. (36)
Proposition 1: It is true that
ϕi,o(w) ≥ ϕ¯i,o(w)
, max{ ln(1 +Ri) :
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1∑Mj 6=i |h¯Hjiwj |2 + δ∑Mj=1 |χHjiwj |2 + σ2i < Ri
)
< ǫ}. (37)
Proof: By (36), if Ri > 0 such that
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1∑Mj 6=i |h¯Hjiwj|2 + δ∑Mj=1 |χHjiwj|2 + σ2i < Ri
)
< ǫ
then
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
∑M
j 6=i |(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
< ǫ
and (37) follows. 
Applying (63) in Appendix I for
a = |h¯Hiiwi|2, b = (1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 + σ2i
gives
ϕi,o(w) ≥ max { ln(1 +Ri) : δ
[
δM ||wmin||2 + M − 1
2
||wmin||2 ln ϕi(w,Ri)||wmin||2
]
≤
ϕi(w,Ri)}, (38)
where
ϕi(w,Ri) ,
|h¯Hiiwi|2
Ri
−
[
(1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj|2 + σ2i
]
,
0 < δM , −
(
ln ǫ− lnM + 1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i) +
M − 1
2
ln δ
)
= ln ǫ−1 + lnM − 1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i) +
M − 1
2
ln δ−1,
13
and
||wmin||2 = min
i=1,...,M
||wi||2.
Recall that Γ(i) are defined from (63).
Therefore, the problem of secrecy rate maximin optimization (3) is formulated by
max
w,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[ln(1 +Ri)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (3b), (20b), (20c), (39a)
ϕi(w,Ri) > 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, (39b)
δ
[
δM ||wmin||2 + M − 1
2
||wmin||2 ln ϕi(w,Ri)||wmin||2
]
≤ ϕi(w,Ri), i = 1, . . . ,M, (39c)
where ln(1+Ri)−ln(1+ri) in (39a) represents a lower bound for the user i’s secrecy throughput.
Constraints (20b), (39b)-(39c) in (39) are nonconvex, which need to be innerly approximated at
each iteration. Let (w(κ), R(κ), r(κ)) be a feasible point for (39) found from the (κ−1)th iteration.
We have provided an inner approximation for (20b) by (22) and (29b). Note that |h¯Hiiwi|2/Ri
is a convex function, so
|h¯Hiiwi|2/Ri ≥ ℓ(κ)i (wi,Ri)
for
ℓ
(κ)
i (wi,Ri) , 2ℜ{(w(κ)i )H h¯iih¯Hiiwi}/R(κ)i −Ri|h¯Hiiw(κ)i |2/(R(κ)i )2,
which is the linearization of |h¯Hiiwi|2/Ri at (w(κ)i , R(κ)i ). Therefore, the nonconvex constraint
(39b) is innerly approximated by the convex constraint
ℓ
(κ)
i (wi,Ri) > (1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj|2 + σ2i , i = 1, . . . ,M. (40)
Furthermore, for
x
(κ)
i ,
ϕi(w
(κ), R
(κ)
i )
||w(κ)min||2
it is true that
ln
ϕi(w,Ri)
||wmin||2 ≤ ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1 +
ϕi(w,Ri)
x
(κ)
i ||wmin||2
that yields
||wmin||2 ln ϕi(w,Ri)||wmin||2 ≤
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
||wmin||2 + ϕi(w,Ri)
x
(κ)
i
Constraint (39c) is thus innerly approximated by
δ
[
M − 1
2
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
+ δM
]
||wmin||2 ≤
(
1− δ(M − 1)/2x(κ)i
)
ϕi(w,Ri), (41)
i = 1, . . . ,M.
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Set
imin = arg min
i=1,...,M
||w(κ)i ||2,
i.e.
||w(κ)imin||2 = mini=1,...,M ||w
(κ)
i ||2.
Verifying numerically that M−1
2
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
+ δM ≥ 0 and 1− δ(M − 1)/2x(κ)i ≥ 0, we use
ϕi(w,Ri) ≥ ϕ(κ)i (w,Ri) , ℓ(κ)i (wi,Ri)− (1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 − σ2i (42)
in providing the following convex inner approximation of (41) for each i = 1, . . . ,M :
δ
[
M − 1
2
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
+ δM
]
||wimin||2 ≤
(
1− δ(M − 1)/2x(κ)i
)
ϕ
(κ)
i (w,Ri), (43)
i = 1, . . . ,M.
Accordingly, the next feasible point (w(κ+1), R
(κ+1)
l , r
(κ+1)
u ) is generated at the κ-th iteration by
the optimal solution of the convex optimization problem
max
w,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri)] s.t (3b), (20c), (22), (29b), (40), (43). (44)
At the same κ-th iteration, r
(κ+1)
i is found from solving (30) by bisection on [0, r
(κ+1)
u,i ] such that
(31), while R
(κ+1)
i is found from solving
ζi(Ri) = 0 (45)
by bisection on a segment
[Rl,i, Ru,i] (46)
such that
− ǫb ≤ ζi(R(κ+1)i ) ≤ 0. (47)
for
ζi(Ri) , −ϕi(w(κ+1),Ri) + δM − 1
2
||w(κ+1)min ||2 ln
ϕi(w
(κ+1),Ri)
||w(κ+1)min ||2
+ δδM ||w(κ+1)min ||2. (48)
Both Rl,i and Ru,i in (46) can be easily determined as follow. If ζi(R
(κ+1)
l ) > 0 set Ru,i =
R
(κ+1)
l and Rl,i = R
(κ+1)
l /ν with the smallest integer ν such that ζi(R
(κ+1)
l /ν) < 0. Otherwise,
ζi(R
(κ+1)
l ) < 0 set Rl,i = R
(κ+1)
l and R
(κ+1)
u = νR
(κ+1)
l with the smallest integer ν such that
ζi(νR
(κ+1)
l ) > 0.
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Algorithm 4 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point (w(0), R(0), r(0)) for (39) and calculate
R
(0)
min as the value of the objective function in (39) at (w
(0), R(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (44) to obtain the solution (w(κ+1), R(κ+1)l , r(κ+1)u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (30) to obtain the roots r(κ)i .
• Solve the nonlinear equations (45) for ζi(Ri) defined by (48) to obtain the roots R(κ+1)i .
• Calculate R(κ+1)min as the value of the objective function in (39) at (w(κ), R(κ+1), r(κ+1)).
• Reset κ+ 1 → κ.
until
R
(κ+1)
min −R
(κ+1)
min )
R
(κ)
min
≤ ǫtol.
An initial feasible (w(0), R(0), r(0)) can be easily found as follows: taking w(0) and r(0) as the
optimal solution of (20) and R
(0)
i is found from solving −ǫb ≤ ζi(Ri) ≤ 0 for
ζi(Ri) , −ϕi(w(0),Ri) + δM − 1
2
||w(0)min||2 ln
ϕi(w
(0),Ri)
||w(0)min||2
+ δδM ||w(0)min||2
by bisection on [Rl,i, Ru,i]. Here
Ru,i =
|hHiew(0)i |2∑
j 6=i |hHjew(0)j |2 + σ2e
while Rl,i = Ru,i/ν with the smallest integer such that ζi(Ru,i/n) < 0.
Next, we address the EE maximization (4) by the following iterations with the convergence
guaranteed.
• Initialization. Use Algorithm 4 to obtain a feasible point (w(0), R(0), r(0)) and define
θ(0) ,
M∑
i=1
[ln(1 +R
(0)
i )− ln(1 + r(0)i )]/π(w(0)).
• κ-th iteration. Let (w(κ), R(κ), r(κ)) be a feasible point found from the (κ− 1)th iteration.
Define
θ(κ) ,
M∑
i=1
[ln(1 +R
(κ)
i )− ln(1 + r(κ)i )]/π(w(κ))
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and then solve the two following convex optimization problems to generate the next feasible
point (w(κ+1), R
(κ+1)
l , r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
w,r
M∑
i=1
[A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri)]− θ(κ)π(w)
s.t. (3b), (20c), (22), (29b), (40), (43),
A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M, (49)
Further, r
(κ+1)
i is found from solving (30), while R
(κ+1)
i is found from solving (46) till
satisfactory of (47) for ζ(Ri) defined by (48).
VI. SIMULATION
This section presents numerical results to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed algo-
rithms. Each transmitter is equipped with Nt = 4 antennas. Scenarios of M ∈ {2, 5, 6} pairs
with the noise variance σ2i = σ
2
e = 1 mW are simulated. All entries of channels hje and hie
in (1) and (2) are generated by independent and identically distributed complex normal random
variables of zero mean and unit variance. The drain efficiency 1/ζ of power amplifier in (4) is
40% with the circuit power of each transmit antenna Pa = 1.25 mW. The computation tolerance
for terminating all proposed Algorithms is ǫtol = 10
−4. The obtained information throughput
results are divided by ln(2) for expressing secrecy throughputs in bps/Hz and secure energy
efficiencies in bits/J/Hz.
In the below discussion, the terms “Perfect CSI”, “EV outage”, and “User outage ” correspond
to the scenarios discussed in Sections III, Section IV with the eavesdropper outage probability
ǫEV ∈ {0.1, 0.6} in (17), and section V with the channel error bound δ = 0.001 in (34) and user
outage probability ǫc = 0.1 in (35), respectively.
A. Maximin secrecy throughput optimization
This subsection analyzes the impact of channel uncertainties to the users’ achievable secrecy
throughput. Figs. 1, 2 and 3 plot the users’ minimum secrecy throughput versus the transmit
power limitation Pi varying from 10 mW to 50 mW for M = 2,M = 5 and M = 6, respectively.
Intuitively, the secrecy throughput increases in the transmitted power limitation Pi. In each
case of M , both “EV outage” and “User outage” with the small outage probability ǫEV = 0.1
achieve better secrecy throughputs than “Perfect CSI”, but the latter achieves better secrecy
throughputs than the formers with the large outage probability ǫEV = 0.6. This outcome is not
17
10 20 30 40 50
Pi (mW)
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
M
in
 s
ec
re
cy
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 a
m
on
g 
us
er
s 
(bp
s/H
z)
Perfect CSI
EV outage ( EV=0.1)
EV outage ( EV=0.6)
User outage ( EV=0.1)
User outage ( EV=0.6)
Fig. 1. Minimal secrecy throughput among users versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 2.
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Fig. 2. Minimal secrecy throughput among users versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 5.
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Fig. 3. Minimal secrecy throughput among users versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 6.
TABLE I
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR MAXIMIN SECRECY THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZATION WITH M ∈ {2, 5, 6}.
Pi (mW) 10 20 30 40 50
Perfect CSI 9/12/13 8/15/17 10/16/16 9/18/19 8/18/20
EV outage (ǫEV = 0.1) 5/12/14 7/15/17 6/17/17 7/18/18 6/17/20
User outage (ǫEV = 0.1) 5/8/8 3/9/10 4/7/12 5/11/12 4/10/11
EV outage (ǫEV = 0.6) 8/14/14 8/17/18 7/17/20 8/19/20 6/20/22
User outage (ǫEV = 0.6) 6/9/7 6/12/12 3/11/10 4/12/15 4/13/14
surprised because the instantaneous wiretapped throughput defined by (6) is actually higher than
the throughput outage defined by (17) at small outage probabilities ǫEV . These figures also show
that the secrecy output performance is deteriorated with the increased number of transmitter-user
pairs, which leads to a stronger inter-user interference hurting the users’ throughput.
Table I provides the average number of iterations required to solve the problem of maximin
secrecy throughput optimization for the above three cases with M = 2, M = 5 and M = 6,
respectively. On average, the proposed algorithms converge in less than 10, 20 and 22 iterations,
for M = 2, M = 5 and M = 6, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Energy efficiency versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 2.
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Fig. 5. Sum throughput versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 2.
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Fig. 6. Total power consumption versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 2.
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Fig. 7. Energy efficiency versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 5.
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Fig. 8. Energy efficiency versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M = 6.
B. Secure energy efficiency maximization
This subsection examines the performance of the proposed SEE maximization algorithms. The
threshold ci in (4b) for QoS is 2 bps/Hz, 1 bps/Hz and 0.6 bps/Hz for M = 2, M = 5 and
M = 6, respectively. The transmit power limitation Pi varies from 5 mW to 25 mW. Fig. 4
shows that “EV outage” with the small outage probability ǫEV = 0.1 significantly outperforms
other cases. The corresponding sum secrecy throughput and total transmit power plotted in Figs.
5 and 6 particularly explain this. “EV outage” with ǫEV = 0.1 achieves higher sum secrecy
throughput in Fig. 5 and consumes less power in Fig. 6. Furthermore, the SEE performances
saturates when the transmit power limitation exceeds the threshold 10 mW. In the region of small
transmit power limitation, the denominator of SEE is dominated by the circuit power so the SEE
is maximized by maximizing the sum secrecy throughput in the numerator. However, in larger
regions of transmit power limitation, the denominator of SEE becomes to be dominated by the
actual transmit power, which by Fig. 6 saturates after Pi = 10 mW, making the sum secrecy
throughput and SEE behave similarly in Figs. 4 and 5. Further, by Fig. 7 and 8, SEE follows a
similar pattern for M = 5 and M = 6, respectively.
Lastly, the average number of iterations is provided by Table II, which particularly shows
that our proposed SEE maximization algorithm on average converges in less than 16, 24 and 28
22
TABLE II
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR SECURE ENERGY EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION WITH M ∈ {2, 5, 6}.
Pi (mW) 5 10 15 20 25
Perfect CSI 10/14/19 13/18/23 14/20/25 14/21/27 15/22/28
EV outage (ǫEV = 0.1) 10/14/16 12/17/21 12/18/21 13/19/22 14/19/22
User outage (ǫEV = 0.1) 3/7/9 4/7/9 5/9/10 3/8/9 6/10/11
EV outage (ǫEV = 0.6) 11/16/18 13/19/23 15/22/25 16/24/26 16/23/28
User outage (ǫEV = 0.6) 5/8/11 7/8/11 4/9/10 6/10/12 5/10/12
iterations for M = 2, M = 5 and M = 6, respectively.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
For a wireless network of multiple transmitter-user pairs overhear by an eavesdropper, we
have considered the beamforming design to maximize either the users’ secrecy throughput or the
network’s secure energy efficiency under QoS constraints in terms of users’ secrecy throughput
thresholds. At different levels of channel knowledge, we have developed path-following algo-
rithms of low complexity but rapid convergence for computation. The provided simulations have
not only shown the efficiency of the developed algorithms but also linked the outage probability
with the secrecy degree. Extensions to multi-cell coordinated beamforming are underway.
APPENDIX I: OUTAGE PROBABILITY INEQUALITIES
We derive bounds for
Prob


a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
< r

 (50)
⇔ Prob
(
a/r − b < δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2
)
(51)
for a > 0, b > 0 and r > 0. Here χi ∈ CN (0, I) while wi are deterministic complex vectors.
Note that
|〈χi,wi〉|2 = ||wi||2|〈χi,wi/||wi||〉|2 = ||wi||2pi
where pi is an exponential distribution with the unit mean.
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As
a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
<
a
b
the probability in (50) is not zero if and only if
r < a/b⇔ a/r − b > 0. (52)
For
||wmin||2 , min
i=1,...,M
||wi||2.
it follows that
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
= Prob
(
M∑
i=1
||wi||2pi < (a/r − b)/δ
)
≤ Prob
(
M∑
i=1
||wmin||2pi < (a/r − b)/δ
)
= Prob
(
M∑
i=1
pi < (a/r − b)/δ||wmin||2
)
=
∫
M∑
i=1
ti <
a− rb
δ||wmin||2
M∏
i=1
e−tidt1 · · · dtM .
Using the representation
u(x) =
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
ex(ω + β)
ω + β
dω
for the unit step function [37] leads to ∫
M∑
i=1
ti <
a− rb
δ||wmin||2
M∏
i=1
e−tidt1 · · ·dtM =
1
2π
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
e
[
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2 −
M∑
i=1
ti
]
(ω + β)
ω + β
(
M∏
i=1
e−tidti
)
dω =
1
2π
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
M∏
i=1
e−ti(1 + ω + β)dt1 . . . dtM e
(ω + β)
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2
ω + β
dω =
24
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
1
(1 + ω + β)M
e
(ω + β)
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2
ω + β
dω =
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
[
1
ω + β
−
M∑
i=1
1
(1 + ω + β)i
]
e
(ω + β)
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2 dω, (53)
where for the last equality we have used
1
x(1 + x)M
=
1
x
−
M∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
, (54)
which can be proved by mathematical induction. Indeed, it is obvious that
1
x(1 + x)
=
1
x
− 1
1 + x
,
i.e. (54) holds true for M = 1. Suppose that (54) is true for M = n, i.e.
1
x(1 + x)n
=
1
x
−
n∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
.
Then
1
x
−
n+1∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
= (
1
x
−
n∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
)− 1
(1 + x)n+1
=
1
x(1 + x)n
− 1
(1 + x)n+1
=
1
x(1 + x)n+1
,
i.e. (54) is true for M = n+ 1, completing the proof for (54).
Furthermore, by [37, (28)-(29)]
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
ex(ω + β)
ω + β
dω = 1 for x > 0,
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
ex(ω + β)
(1 + ω + β)i
dω =
e−xxi−1
Γ(i)
for x > 0,
where Γ(i) ,
∫∞
0
ti−1/etdt, for which Γ(1) = Γ(2) = 1, Γ(3) = 2, Γ(4) = 6, Γ(5) = 24.
We thus obtain
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
≤ 1− e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
, (55)
or
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 ≥ (a/r − b)/δ
)
= 1− Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
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≥ 1−
[
1− e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
]
= e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||
2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
. (56)
Analogously,
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
≥ 1− e−(a/r − b)/δ||wmax||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmax||2)i−1 ,(57)
for
||wmax||2 , max
i=1,...,M
||wi||2.
Therefore, we arrive at the following result.
Theorem 1: The following two-sided inequalities hold true:
e−(a/r − b)/δ||wmin||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
≤ (58)
Prob
(
a/r − b < δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2
)
= Prob


a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
≤ r

 ≤
e−(a/r − b)/δ||wmax||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b))i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmax||2)i−1 . (59)

Now, by Cauchy inequality
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
≥ M
(
M∏
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
)1/M
=
M
(
∏M
i=1 Γ(i))
1/M
(
(a/r − b)
δ||wmin||2
)(M−1)/2
.
Therefore, it follows from (58) that
e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||
2 M
(
∏M
i=1 Γ(i))
1/M
(
(a/r − b)
δ||wmin||2
)(M−1)/2
≤
Prob


a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
≤ r

 . (60)
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Then
max


r : Prob


a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
≤ r

 ≤ ǫ


≥
max
{
r : e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||
2 M
(
∏M
i=1 Γ(i))
1/M
(
(a/r − b)
δ||wmin||2
)(M−1)/2
≤ ǫ
}
= (61)
max
{
r : − a/r − b
δ||wmin||2 + (lnM −
1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i))
+
M − 1
2
(
ln(a/r − b)− ln δ − ln ||wmin||2
) ≤ ln ǫ} = (62)
max
{
r : − a/r − b||wmin||2 + δ(lnM −
1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i))
+ δ
M − 1
2
(
ln(a/r − b)− ln δ − ln ||wmin||2
) ≤ δ ln ǫ} =
max
{
r : − a/r − b||wmin||2 + δ
M − 1
2
(
ln(a/r − b)− ln ||wmin||2
) ≤
δ
(
ln ǫ− lnM + 1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i) +
M − 1
2
ln δ
)}
. (63)
Note that for M = 1 it follows from (58) and (59) that
Prob
(
a
|〈χ,w〉|2 + b < r
)
= e−(a/r−b)/||w||
2
,
which is a known result since |〈χ,w〉|2 is an exponential distribution with mean ||w||2:
Prob
(
a
|〈χ,w〉|2 + b < r
)
= Prob
(
a/r − b < 〈χ,w〉|2)
=
∫ ∞
a/r−b
e−t/||w||2/||w||2dt
= e−(a/r−b)/||w||
2
.
Particularly,
max{r : Prob
(
a
δ|〈χ,w〉|2 + b < r
)
≤ ǫ} = a
b+ δ||w||2 ln ǫ−1 . (64)
APPENDIX II: BERNSTEIN-TYPE INEQUALITY AND ITS CONSERVATIVENESS
There is an approach, which is based on the following Bernstein-type inequality [18] of rough
estimation.
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Theorem 2: [18, Lemma 0.2] Suppose that A is a symmetric matrix and z is Gaussian with
zero mean and identity covariance. Then
Prob
(
zHAz ≥ trace(A) + 2||A||√x+ 2λ+max(A)x
) ≤ exp(−x), (65)
where λ+max(A) = max{λmax, 0}.
One can use inequality (65) for an inner approximation of the set
Rǫ(a, b) ,
{
r : Prob
(
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 > a
r
− b
)
≤ ǫ
}
. (66)
By setting z = [χTi ]
T
i=1,...,M and
A = diag[wiw
H
i ]i=1,...,M
we have
∑M
i=1 |〈χi,wi〉|2 = zHAz and trace(A) =
∑M
i=1 ||wi||2, and
λmax(A) = max
i=1,...,M
[||wi||2] and ||A|| =
√√√√ M∑
i=1
||wi||4.
According to (65)
Prob
(
zHAz ≥ trace(A) + 2||A||
√
ln ǫ−1 + 2λmax(A) ln ǫ
−1
)
≤ ǫ.
Therefore, r ∈ Rǫ(a, b) if
(
a
r
− b)/δ ≥ trace(A) + 2||A||
√
ln ǫ−1 + 2λmax(A) ln ǫ
−1
⇔ (a
r
− b)/δ ≥
M∑
i=1
||wi||2 + 2
√√√√ M∑
i=1
||wi||4
√
ln ǫ−1 + 2 max
i=1,...,M
[||wi||2] ln ǫ−1
⇔ r ≤ a/

b+ δ

 M∑
i=1
||wi||2 + 2
√√√√ M∑
i=1
||wi||4
√
ln ǫ−1 + 2 max
i=1,...,M
[||wi||2] ln ǫ−1



(67)
which is too conservative compared with (63). For instance, for M = 1, (67) means
r = a/(b+ δ||w||2(1 + 2
√
ln ǫ−1 + 2 ln ǫ−1))
which is very conservative compared with (64).
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APPENDIX III: BASIC DETERMINISTIC INEQUALITIES
For every x > 0, y > 0, x¯ > 0 and y¯ > 0,
ln(1 + 1/xy) ≥ ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯) + 1/x¯y¯
1 + 1/x¯y¯
(2− x/x¯− y/y¯), (68)
which follows from the convexity of function ln(1 + 1/xy) in the domain {x > 0, y > 0}.
Furthermore,
ln(1 + x/y) ≤ ln(1 + x¯/y¯) + 1
1 + x¯/y¯
(x/y − x¯/y¯), (69)
which follows from the concavity of function ln(1 + z) in the domain {z > 0}. Lastly, based
on the inequality
x2/t ≥ 2(x¯/t¯)x− (x¯2/t¯2)t ∀ x > 0, x¯ > 0, t > 0, t¯ > 0 (70)
that follows from the convexity of x2/t, we have the following inequality
r
||w||2 ≥ 2(
√
r¯/||w¯||2)√r − (r¯/||w¯||4)||w||2 ∀ r > 0, r¯ > 0,w ∈ CN , w¯ ∈ CN . (71)
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